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Abstract  
Escalating costs in UK statutory adjudications under the Housing Grants, 
Construction & Regeneration Act (HGCRA)1996 have restricted the use of the 
procedure by some of the very parties whose interests the legislation was set up to 
protect. This paper analyses those provisions including under the amendments in the 
Local Democracy Economic Development and Construction Act (LDEDCA) 2009 
which may be contributing towards this problem. It provides a comparative overview 
of the equivalent Singaporean legislation in order to determine which provisions from 
the latter could be adopted to improve the situation in the UK. The paper concludes 
that to reduce costs in the statutory adjudication process under the UK HGCRA, 
incorporating a maximum cap on adjudicator’s fees and providing for an adjudication 
review procedure both of which are found in Singapore’s Security of Payment Act 
2004 may assist to keep adjudication costs and expenses in the UK building and 
construction industry reasonable.  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction   
By the 1990’s, parties to construction contracts, especially those who were smaller in 
size such as sub-contractors with limited resources, would have been reluctant to take 
a dispute to litigation or arbitration, particularly if it was relatively low in value.  A 
smaller party’s resources tied up during the course of the lengthy proceedings could 
be better used elsewhere.  In some cases, it is conceivable that any victory in the 
settlement of a dispute could be completely offset by the costs of the proceedings.  It 
would appear for these parties, a less formal and faster method of resolution, such as 
adjudication would be appealing.  Since the first UK standard form to incorporate an 
adjudication provision was a sub-contract agreement, it is evident at this time 
adjudication was intended as the “smaller” party’s alternative to litigation and 
arbitration.   However, in order for the full benefit of a dispute resolution process such 
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as adjudication to be enjoyed by all types of parties to construction contracts, 
adjudication would have to be made widely available. 
 
In 1994 Michael Latham compiled a report which was commissioned by the UK 
construction industry council and the UK government entitled “Constructing the 
Team”. The report made thirty recommendations for the construction industry to 
adopt which were aimed at improving the industry as a whole, for all stakeholders.    
Recommendation number 26 proposed that Adjudication should be the normal 
method of dispute resolution for the UK construction industry1. 
 
Following Latham’s 1994 report, the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration 
Act 1996 (hereinafter, HGCRA) was passed by the House of Lords.  The HGCRA, 
which encapsulated many of the recommendations made in the report, contained 
provisions for statutory adjudication (hereinafter, SA) for disputes arising under 
construction contracts.  Since the implementation of the HGCRA in 1998, the number 
of litigations and arbitrations used to settle construction disputes has declined 
steadily2.  Graph 1 shows the number of new proceedings in the Technology and 
Construction Court falling from approximately 1500 in 1996 to around 500 a year on 
average between 2000 and 2013. 
 
 
Graph 1: Decline in new proceedings issued in the Technology and Construction 
Court since 19953 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Latham, ‘Constructing The Team: Final Report of the Government/Industry Review of 
Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the UK Construction Industry’ (HMSO 1994).  
2 Abdul Jinadu, ‘Resolving Construction Disputes – The UK Experience’ (Keating Chambers 2014) 
<https://ciarbng.wildapricot.org/Resources/Documents/Resolving%20Construction%20Disputes%20-
%20The%20UK%20Experience%20Final%20%281%29.pdf> accessed 4 February 2016. 
3 ibid. 
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Graph 2 shows the reduction in the number of new appointments of arbitrators made 
by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators for construction disputes from approximately 
75 and 70 in 1998 and 1999 respectively, to around 20 in 2010 and 2011, with a 
steady increase in 2012 and 2013 back up to 60. 
 
Graph 2: Reduction in number of appointments made by the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators4 
 
 
Graph 1 demonstrates the decline in popularity of litigation since 1996.  However, 
whilst graph 2 does demonstrate a gradual decline in popularity of arbitration since 
1998, the number of new appointments made has increased in recent years.  This 
resurgence could be a sign that arbitration is being favoured as an alternative to SA, or 
it may be that more adjudications are now being referred to arbitration for final 
determination. 
 
 
This paper aims to draw attention to the areas that merit closer examination in UK 
statutory adjudication, namely, the costs incurred by parties. Section 2 of this paper 
reviews the adjudication process under the HGCRA. Section 3 examines the disparity 
between statute and practice and section 4 reviews the amendments brought in by the 
Local Democracy, Economic Development & Construction Act 2009 (LDEDCA). 
Section 5 draws on the comparisons between statutory adjudication in Singapore. The 
paper concludes in section 6. 
                                                 
4 ibid. 
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2. Adjudication under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 
The HGCRA came into force on 1 May 1998 in England, Wales and Scotland; and 1 
June 1998 in Northern Ireland5. Section 108 sets out provisions for referring a dispute 
under a Construction Contract to SA. Section 108(1) clearly states that a dispute 
means “any difference”, which could mean the smallest disagreement over the 
interpretation of a sentence in the contract, or the difference in value of £5m on a final 
account on a multi-million-pound project. In the case of Banner Holdings Ltd v 
Colchester Borough Council6  a contract attempted to limit the type of dispute that 
could be referred to adjudication.  When a certain dispute was referred under that 
contract, it was claimed that when the adjudicator accepted act, he had no jurisdiction.  
It was held that the adjudicator did have jurisdiction to decide with the judge stating 
that section 108 contains no qualification or limitation, upon the nature, scope and 
extent of the disputes that can be referred to an adjudication under a construction 
contract.  The decision in this case reiterates that any dispute arising under the 
contract, no matter how complex or simple, can be referred to SA.  There is literally 
no limit so long as it arises under a Construction Contract and satisfies sections 104-
107 of the HGCRA, which gives parties freedom to refer any grievance they have, 
which is very much in line with the original intention of the Latham Report.   
 
On one hand, this is very useful to a party, especially one with less financial clout and 
stature, since it’s a process they can use if they find themselves being bullied by a 
larger party.  Conversely, as does sometimes happen in practice, there is the 
opportunity to refer several different small disputes (via different notices) to SA one 
after the other, which can mean that several adjudications end up running 
concurrently, increasing the costs for those same smaller parties who will need to 
submit responses to each, with additional adjudicators fees and the cost of their own 
resources and/or solicitors and experts.   
 
                                                 
5 John Riches, Construction Adjudication (2nd edn, Blackwell 2004) 3. 
6 [2010] EWHC 139 (TCC).  
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Section 108(2) states that a party can give notice at any time of its intention to refer a 
dispute to adjudication7.  In A&D Maintenance and Construction Ltd v Pagehurst 
Construction Services Ltd8 it was decided that a dispute which arose under a sub-
contract which had already been determined previously was allowed to be referred to 
adjudication since it was still a “dispute arising under the contract”.  This decision 
demonstrates that even if a contact is brought to a close, it can still be opened up and a 
dispute under it be adjudicated upon.  This may be problematic to companies who felt 
that they had finalised a final account for a project and had made allowances in their 
budgets based upon that, only for the final account to be opened up again. 
 
In Herschel Engineering Ltd v Breen Property Ltd9 Herschel commenced adjudication 
proceedings against Breen after court proceedings were commenced for the same 
dispute.  It was held that they were entitled to do so, as a referral to adjudication can 
be made any time including after court proceedings have been issued.  This case 
demonstrates that a company may have to fight the same dispute concurrently, in two 
different dispute resolution forums.  This could mean that a party finds itself paying 
two lots of costs to attempt to determine the same dispute and to a smaller contractor 
this could be fatal in terms of its survival. 
 
In London Borough of Camden v Makers UK Ltd10 Camden sought to prevent Makers 
from adjudicating on a dispute due to its poor financial position and that any decision 
that was given should not be enforced due to its financial troubles.  It was held that 
this was not a reason to deprive Makers from its right to adjudicate under the 
HGCRA, even if it would not be able to pay any money and it could be seen as 
pointless.  Even if it is obvious that payment from one party to another after the 
decision may not be possible due to financial problems, the right to refer to SA is 
maintained.  However, the decision to allow this to happen, whilst upholding the 
principles of SA, may not actually make sense for either party as both will incur costs, 
potentially for a result that cannot be upheld because there is no money to change 
hands. 
 
                                                 
7 The Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 s 108(2)(a). 
8 [1999] July 1999 CILL 1518 (TCC). 
9 [2000] BLR 272 (TCC). 
10 [2009] EWHC 2944 (TCC). 
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Disagreements as to complexity in disputes does not appear to affect the time limits 
set out under S108(2). In the cases of London & Amsterdam Properties Limited v 
Waterman Partnership Limited11 and AWG Construction Services Ltd v Rockingham 
Motor Speedway Ltd12 it was suggested by the judges that the disputes in question in 
those two cases were too complex to be decided fairly within the time limits of 
adjudication.  Furthermore, in CIB Properties Ltd v Birse Construction13 Birse argued 
inter alia that the size and complexity of the dispute meant that it could not be 
resolved fairly by adjudication.  However, it was decided that the dispute was not too 
complex as the adjudicator’s decision clearly stated that if he had felt unable to 
provide decision, he wouldn’t have adjudicated.  Therefore, there is no limit on 
complexity of dispute that can be referred to adjudication. Whilst it was suggested 
that the disputes were too complex to be fairly decided at SA, enforcement of the 
decisions was not resisted on these grounds.  Therefore, whilst it may be true that the 
disputes were too complex and should have been settled by arbitration or litigation, it 
was technically correct to settle them via SA. 
 
In allowing a dispute to be referred at any time, it can be argued that section 108(2)(a) 
can be both positive and negative to parties.  On one hand, a dispute can be referred 
the same day that it arises, during the course of the project, which means it will be 
settled sooner, potentially leading to less external expense.  On the other, a dispute on 
a final account can be referred a year after the project has finished.  In this situation, a 
party may have thought the final account figure was agreed, only for that figure to be 
adjudicated long after the project has completed. 
 
It is important at this point to mention the Scheme for Construction Contracts 
(England & Wales) Regulations 1998 (the Scheme). The Scheme was introduced in 
conjunction with the HGCRA.  It states the SA provisions that shall be used, should 
the Construction contract not comply with the provisions of the HGCRA.  
Specifically, it sets out a procedure for adjudication, including the rights and duties of 
the parties, the duties and powers of the adjudicator and the objective timetable for the 
                                                 
11 [2003] EWHC 3059 (TCC). 
12 [2004] EWHC 888 (TCC). 
13 [2004] EWHC 2365 (TCC). 
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adjudication14.  Part 1 of the Scheme provides regulations for SA and is split into four 
main sections: Notice of intention to seek adjudication; The powers of the adjudicator; 
The Adjudicator’s decision and; The effects of the decision. These are discussed 
below. 
 
2.1 Notice of Intention to Seek Adjudication 
Section 8(3) of the Scheme enables the extension of the 28-day period in which an 
adjudicator must reach a decision: It is similar to section 108(2)(d) of the HGCRA in 
stating that the 28-day period can be extended, however Section 108(2)(d) of the 
HGCRA states it can be extended by 14 days, whilst Section 8(3) of the Scheme puts 
no limit on how far it can be extended by.  On one hand, Section 8(3) is positive in 
that it allows the adjudicator more time to deal with potentially complex disputes that 
have been referred to him, thus enabling him to better analyse the information 
provided to him and give a clearer and better informed decision to the parties on the 
dispute.  Conversely, by allowing the adjudication to go on for a further non-specific 
period of time, often a lot longer than 28 days (lasting up to 5 months in some cases in 
our own experience) the costs the parties incur will greatly increase.   
 
2.2 Powers of the Adjudicator 
Section 12(b) relates to adjudicators actions during the adjudication and requires the 
adjudicator to “avoid incurring unnecessary expense.” In theory this should keep the 
costs passed on to the parties down to those absolutely essential.  However, in practice 
“unnecessary” can be seen as a subjective term.  Therefore, it is perhaps quite difficult 
to determine what is an unnecessary cost incurred unless it is a cost so blatant, such as 
something passed on to the parties that has nothing to do with the adjudication.  
Therefore, unless the adjudicator is conscientious when incurring costs and doesn’t 
pass down those costs which are unnecessary to the parties, it can be argued that the 
provision at Section 12(b) does not hold much power.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Martin Burns, ‘Adjudication and the resolution of disputes in the construction industry’ (2002) 7(2) 
Coventry law Journal 38. 
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2.3 The Effects of the Decision 
The Scheme allows the adjudicator “…such reasonable amount as he may determine 
by way of fees and expenses reasonably incurred by him…”15 Any outstanding costs 
are borne by the parties jointly and severally, “…following the making of any 
determination on how the payment shall be apportioned.”16 These provisions are 
essentially subjective and may make it difficult for parties to determine their SA costs, 
a priori. Whilst the adjudicator will provide his hourly/daily fee rates before he is 
appointed, there is no cap or maximum to what can be incurred within the HGCRA or 
the Scheme.  Therefore, it is difficult for users of SA to undertake a cost/benefit 
analysis and decide whether it’s worth referring a dispute to SA. 
 
Section 26 of the Scheme concerns the adjudicator’s liability in his role. Liability is 
limited to acts or omissions committed in bad faith and this limitation is extended to 
employees or agents of the adjudicator. Section 26 provides cover for the adjudicator 
should he make any genuine mistake in undertaking his duties.  This is required since 
the adjudicator often has to contend with a lot of information from both parties and 
provide a decision in a short timescale.  Section 26 therefore ensures that he can do 
his job without fear that he will be punished for genuine mistake.  However, in 
allowing genuine mistakes within decisions, parties could be given decisions which 
are erroneous and since the decision is binding, have no recourse until final 
determination.  This would be harsh on smaller parties with less financial resources, 
since they would have incurred costs for the adjudication and have a decision which is 
essentially wrong. 
 
 
 
3. Statutory Adjudication in the UK : between intention and reality 
The intention of SA was to provide a quick and cheap interim remedy to disputes 
arising during a construction project, to protect cash-flow.  It was envisaged that SA 
would deal with simple disputes quickly, such as delay and disruption claims, 
extensions of time and payment disputes17.  Furthermore, it was thought that SA 
                                                 
15 Ibid s25. 
16 Ibid. 
17 A Willis, ‘The Other Side of the Adjudication Coin’, (2014) 25(5) Construction Law Journal 23. 
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would be used to resolve many minor disputes as the works progressed18.  It was also 
envisaged that the tight time frame in which an adjudication decision was to be given 
meant that injustice would often occur19.  However, this was seen as part and parcel of 
the process.  In the early case of Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v The Mayor & 
Burgesses of the London Borough of Lambeth Council20 the judge in his decision 
noted that “..,the purpose of adjudication is not to be thwarted by an overly sensitive 
concern for procedural niceties.”21 
 
It appears that SA would be ideally suited to those sub-contractors and smaller main 
contractors for which cash flow was critical to survival as it would allow them to 
quickly and cheaply as the works progressed.  The judge’s comments in Balfour 
Beatty also reinforce that the procedure should be fast, above all else. 
 
Yet in the 18 years the HGCRA has been in force, matters which are referred to SA 
have developed to be quite different to those originally imagined.  It now often 
includes claims for complex contractual interpretation, misrepresentation, and 
professional negligence disputes, which are frequently made months or even years 
after the conclusion of the contract.  Consequently, the quick and cheap process takes 
much longer and is much more expensive (Willis 2014)22.  In a paper reviewing SA, 
Anderson observes and we agree, that the reality is vastly different from what was 
envisaged under the statutory provisions.23 He notes that in practice, the vast majority 
of SA’s normally arise quite far through the course of works, either in the form of a 
disputed application for interim payment, or for final account. Although half of all 
adjudications appear to be for less than £50,000, quite large sums, often in the order 
of £10 million are regularly adjudicated upon; Although SAs do appear to be being 
dealt with expeditiously, with the admittedly very tight time-limits for SA largely 
being adhered to, it is normal practice for the parties, or their representatives, to agree 
                                                 
18 R.N.H Anderson, ‘For the greater good - a pre adjudication protocol?’ (2006) 22(7) Construction 
Law Journal 437. 
19 Macob Civil Engineering Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd [1999] EWHC Technology 254. 
20 [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC). 
21  [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC) at Paragraph 27  
22 A Willis, ‘The Other Side of the Adjudication Coin’, (2014) 25(5) Construction Law Journal 23. 
23 R.N.H Anderson, ‘For the greater good - a pre adjudication protocol?’ (2006) 22(7) Construction 
Law Journal 437. 
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to give the adjudicator something in the way of an extension of time to produce his or 
her decision. 
 
Furthermore, SAs can no longer be considered a cheaper alternative in resolving 
construction disputes. Although the average fee for an adjudicator is said to be in the 
region of £3,725, fees of £40,000 or so are not unusual and, in the larger cases, fees of 
the order of £100,000.  Party’s costs can also spiral, having been known in some cases 
to exceed £1,000,000.24 In addition, only a small number of SA’s are actually taken 
forward for “final determination” in the form of either arbitration or litigation.  To this 
effect, it can be argued that SA appears to have replaced arbitration. 
 
In AWG Construction Services Ltd v Rockingham Motor Speedway25 the judge made 
observations as to what adjudication had become: 
 
It has developed into an elaborate and expensive procedure which is wholly 
confrontational, a full-scale trial normally, on the documents, of the issues 
referred to the adjudicator (not necessarily the whole dispute) within a 
timetable of 42 days from notice of adjudication to decision by the 
adjudicator… 
 
It is clear that in reality SA is taking longer since the disputes that are referred are 
more complex than was originally envisaged, leading to extensions to the 28-day 
period and therefore the costs of participating have increased accordingly.  Whilst this 
is a positive development for SA practice, in that it is seen as a forum in which more 
complex disputes which have often occurred after project completion can be settled, 
the costs incurred by longer periods of SA cannot however be ignored. While the 7-
day notice period for referral to SA is strictly enforced, save for external factors that 
the referring party cannot control 26, the 28 day period for a decision is not.  
 
Section 108(2)(c) of the HGCRA and Section 19(1)(a) of the Scheme state that the 
adjudicator shall reach his decision within 28 days of the date of the referral notice.  
                                                 
24 CIB Properties Ltd v Birse Construction [2004] EWHC 2365 (TCC).  
25 [2004] EWHC 888 (TCC) at paragraph 122. 
26 See Cubitt Building & Interiors Ltd v Fleetglade Ltd [2006] EWHC 3413 (TCC); Hart Investments 
Ltd v Fidler & Anor [2006] EWHC 2857 (TCC). 
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This period was deliberately designed to ensure a swift answer when a dispute has 
been referred27.  In Ritchie Brothers (PWC) Ltd v David Philp (Commercials) Ltd28 it 
was determined that the 28-day period for adjudication commenced when the notice 
of referral was dispatched.  However, in the case of Aveat Heating Limited v Jerram 
Falkus Construction Limited29 it was decided that the 28-day period starts from the 
date the referral notice was received by the adjudicator.  These two cases throw up 
ambiguity as to when the 28-day period commences.  Although in reality, there will 
often not be much difference in time between when the referral is dispatched and 
received, it is believed that if there is any conflict between the two positions, the 
position in Aveat v Jerram is preferred 30. 
 
However, in Barnes & Elliot Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Holdings Ltd & Amor31 an 
adjudicator’s decision was completed within the 28-day period but the decision was 
not delivered to the parties until after the 28-day period, due to an error by the 
adjudicator.  It was held that the reaching of a decision and its delivery were two 
separate segments of the adjudication process and that the decision was made in 
compliance with section 108(2)(c) of the HGCRA, even if its delivery was a few days 
late.  In Ritchie Brothers (PWC) Ltd v David Philp (Commercials) Ltd32 the 
adjudicator’s decision was due, in line with section 19(1) of the Scheme, on 16 
October.  The Adjudicator asked the parties for an extension to give the decision, to 
23 October.  However, he did not provide the decision until 27 October.  It was held 
that the adjudicator was outside his jurisdiction since the decision was too late and 
therefore the decision was null.  Similar decisions were reached in the cases of Mott 
McDonald Limited v London & Regional Properties Ltd33 and Lorraine Lee v 
Chartered Properties (Building) Limited34.  These judgements demonstrate that as 
long as the decision is reached within 28 days, it is enforceable.  In this scenario, 
through no fault of their own, the parties to an adjudication will potentially have gone 
to all the trouble and cost of preparing documents, hired and paid for experts, paid the 
                                                 
27 Peter Coulson, ‘Coulson On Construction Adjudication’ (2nd edn, Oxford 2011) 2.114. 
28 [2004] ScotCS 94. 
29 [2007] EWHC 131 (TCC). 
30 Peter Coulson, ‘Coulson On Construction Adjudication’ (2nd edn, Oxford 2011) 2.118. 
31 [2003] EWHC 3100 (TCC). 
32 [2005] ScotCS CSIH_32. 
33 [2007] EWHC 1055 (TCC). 
34 [2010] EWHC 1540 (TCC). 
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adjudicator his fees for his services and still received a decision which may have been 
acceptable on its merits, but cannot be enforced because it was technically served late.  
This will be particularly tough on the party whom the decision favoured, since they 
would have essentially spent money at the adjudication for no purpose. 
 
There are other factors that merit closer consideration in reviewing the reality of SA: 
 
 
3.1 Ambush 
The time limits imposed on SA place the referring party at an advantage as the 
procedure, with its 28-day timetable, does not commence until the notice of 
adjudication has been served by the referring party, therefore it has had a chance to 
get its case in order35.  This could have been taking place over a number of months 
and could mean that the documents submitted are copious.  In comparison, the 
responding party will only have a very limited amount of time to present its case.  
This procedure has become known as ‘ambush’ and is thought by some to be an abuse 
of the SA process36.  In London & Amsterdam Properties Limited v Waterman 
Partnership Limited37 the judge stated that “…mere ambush however unattractive 
does not necessarily amount to procedural unfairness.” 38 
 
Unfortunately, whilst ‘ambush’ is not desirable, it appears acceptable for a party to do 
so.  It will be particularly harsh if, for example, a large company with many resources 
has spent 6 months preparing its case against a small company and in doing so has 
employed many lawyers and experts, spending lots of money.  As soon as it gives 
notice and sends the referral, the responding party, who may or may not be more 
modest in terms of size and resources, will need to answer to the referral quickly.  To 
do so, it either has to employ many resources itself, which will cost a lot of money.  
Alternatively, it may attempt to answer to the referral without the use of these 
additional resources, but in doing so risks submitting a poor representation of its case, 
                                                 
35 Dominic Rawley, ‘Construction Adjudication and Payments Handbook’ (2nd edn, Oxford 2013) 
10.22. 
36 Austin Hall Building Ltd v Buckland Securities Ltd [2001] EWHC Technology 434. 
37 [2003] EWHC 3059 (TCC). 
38 [2003] EWHC 3059 (TCC) at paragraph 179. 
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thus losing and having to pay a substantial amount of money to the referring party.  It 
seems that in terms of costs, the responding party will often be in a lose-lose situation.   
 
 
 
3.2 Errors 
In the case of Bouygues v Dhal Jensen39 the adjudicator miscalculated the amount due 
to the Dhal Jensen as being £200,000, when it should have been an amount of 
£140,000 due to Bouygues.  It was found that although the adjudicator had made an 
error, he had answered the right question in the wrong way, therefore it was an 
erroneous decision which he was entitled to reach and had not acted outside his 
jurisdiction.  However, in the case of Bloor Construction Ltd v Bowmer & Kirkland 
Ltd40 an adjudicator communicated a decision which contained a miscalculation in 
Bloor’s favour.  Upon being informed, the adjudicator checked and amended the 
decision and sent a corrected version out the same day.  Bloor sought to enforce the 
first decision but the second was held to be valid, since the adjudicator had made a 
‘slip’.   
 
It can be seen from these two cases that if there is an error in law or fact that is 
included in the decision, it will remain as part of the decision.  However, if there is an 
error which has occurred as a result of an arithmetic miscalculation this is known as a 
‘slip’.  This can occur when the previous workings in the decision were not added up 
correctly. Where spotted quickly by the parties or the adjudicator himself, the error in 
the decision can be corrected and the decision reissued.  On the one hand this 
demonstrates that in the cut and thrust of SA, errors may be made that the parties will 
have to accept.  However, allowing the correction of slips at least allows some 
recourse when a blatant error in a calculation is made.  In terms of costs this is good 
for parties, since a large miscalculation could mean they have to pay a large amount 
of money in the interim, before taking the dispute to arbitration or litigation to attempt 
to getting that money back. 
 
                                                 
39 [2002] EWCA Civ 507. 
40 [2000] EWHC 103 (TCC). 
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In Steve Domsalla v Kenneth Dyason41 under a contractual adjudication, the 
adjudicator made an error in making his decision when he failed to consider Dyason’s 
defences of abatement and set off due to a lack of withholding notice.  This amounted 
to procedural unfairness since the adjudicator made an error of law and fact, which 
meant he failed to answer the question asked of him, thus the decision was not 
enforceable.  If this had happened in a SA under the HGCRA, it may have been 
acceptable and the decision enforced due to ‘the doctrine of unreviewable error of an 
adjudicator within jurisdiction’ ensuring an error in law or fact will not render a 
decision unenforceable42. The decision in Domsalla v Dyason demonstrates the 
freedom and relative lack of liability an adjudicator performing a statutory 
adjudication under the Act.  Errors which would render him in breach of natural 
justice in a contractual adjudication will most likely not affect him in a SA due to the 
‘doctrine of unreviewable error’.  In other words, his decision cannot be opened up for 
review for errors in fact and law.  Whilst this enables the adjudicator to perform his 
task within the tight 28-day period without hindrance, it will be frustrating for a party 
against whom his decision goes if it is full of obvious errors, especially if they have 
incurred great cost in obtaining that decision.    
 
3.3 Costs & Fees 
In Prentice Island Ltd v Castle Contracting43 an adjudicator carrying out an 
adjudication under the Scheme should have resigned because the dispute was the 
same as one previously referred, but did not.  It was held that the adjudicator had 
acted in good faith and was entitled to be paid his fees regardless of the fact that he 
had no jurisdiction and carried on with the adjudication, even though the parties did 
not have an enforceable decision.  This decision demonstrates that even if the parties 
do not get a decision which is enforceable and therefore essentially useless, through 
no fault of their own, they are still liable to pay the adjudicator his fees and will have 
incurred other costs for experts and solicitors throughout the course of the SA. For a 
small sub-contractor with a good case, relying upon a favourable decision, this could 
be disastrous since its cash flow may be so tight that they spent the money on an SA 
                                                 
41 [2007] EWHC 1174 (TCC). 
42 Peter Coulson, ‘Coulson On Construction Adjudication’ (2nd edn, Oxford 2011) 7.01. 
43 [2003] ScotCS 61. 
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knowing that they needed the adjudicator’s decision at the end of the 28-day period to 
obtain money from the other side to allow the company to survive. 
 
In Griffin v Midas Homes44 an adjudication decision was taken to enforcement on the 
grounds that the adjudicator had no jurisdiction since the dispute hadn’t crystallised.  
In this case, the responding party was not liable to pay fees for any part of the 
decision that could not be enforced, whilst the referring party was.  In contrast to the 
decision in Prentice v Castle, in this case the responding party did not have to pay 
some of the fees since there was no dispute.  This seems fair on the responding party 
as it was not them who referred the non-dispute to SA.  However, the same questions 
are raised as to whether the parties should pay anything for any part of the decision 
which was not enforceable. 
 
With the above cases in mind, in the case of Dr Peter Rankilov v Perco Engineering 
Services45the judge made a comment that it surprised him that even if the adjudicator 
had breached the rules of natural justice and therefore produced a worthless decision 
without any binding effect whatsoever, he would still be entitled to his fees for 
producing that decision.  However, in the recent case of P.C. Harrington Ltd v 
Systech International Ltd46 the court of appeal overturned a previous judgement that 
the adjudicator was entitled to fees for producing an unenforceable decision, due to an 
innocent mistake he made.  Now, the adjudicator was not entitled to the fees and it 
was stated that he would only be entitled to fees if he had produced an enforceable 
decision.  This recent case appears to alter the position with regard to adjudicator’s 
fees when a decision is unenforceable.  The effect of this may be that adjudicators 
think more carefully when they first receive a notice of adjudication and a referral 
document as to whether they have jurisdiction to adjudicate or not.  The effect of this 
will be that less SA’s that should not go ahead do not proceed and the parties will 
therefore save on wasted costs. 
 
In Fenice Investments v Jerram Falkus Construction47the adjudicator decided that the 
losing party would pay his fees.  However, the losing party only paid a small portion 
of his fees claiming they were excessive.  At enforcement, it was held that the fees 
                                                 
44 [2000] 78 Con LR 152 (TCC). 
45 [2006] Adj LR 1/27. 
46 [2012] EWCA Civ 1371 (CA). 
47 [2011] EWHc 1678 (TCC) 141 Con LR 206. 
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were reasonable and the losing party had to pay them.  This case is an example where 
a party has felt that the adjudicator’s fees were excessive, yet cannot do anything 
about it.  There is nothing in the HGCRA or the Scheme which limits the 
adjudicator’s fees and it is unlikely that an adjudicator will cap his fees himself in his 
fee proposal since he won’t know how much time he’ll have to spend on the dispute at 
the start. Therefore, the parties are at the mercy of the adjudicator in this respect and 
will have to accept this is a risk of SA.    
 
 
4. Amendments under the Local Democracy, Economic Development and 
Construction Act 2009 
 
Hoar writes that one of the most controversial matters since the introduction of the SA 
regime under the HGCRA has been the costs of the process. The HGCRA contains no 
provision in relation to payment of the costs of the SA process and the assumption is 
that the parties will be responsible for bearing their own costs.  The position on SA 
costs was the subject of considerable Parliamentary scrutiny whilst the Local 
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (the LDEDCA) 
passed through the legislative process48.  However, whilst the LDEDCA has made 
amendments to the SA provisions, generally speaking, they are not nearly as 
comprehensive and far-reaching as those to the payment provisions49. 
 
The LDEDCA introduced several key changes to the SA provisions within the 
HGCRA and introduced new provisions in certain areas, namely: Oral Contracts; 
Adjudicator’s slips; and Apportionment of costs. The Scheme is also updated by The 
Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 
(Amendment) (England) Regulations 2011 (Scheme amendments)50.  The extent of 
the amendments in these three areas are discussed below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Chris Hoar, ‘Change is Coming’ (2011) Jul/Aug Construction Newsletter 2. 
49 D Helps, ‘Construction Act Review (October): Outlawing Tolent Clauses and the LDEDC Act 2009 - 
the denouement of section 108A’ (2011) 27(7) Construction Law Journal 575. 
50 The Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 (Amendment) 
(England) Regulations 2011. 
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4.1 Oral Contracts 
Section 139(1) of the LDEDCA repealed section 107 of the HGCRA51 which had 
provided that only agreements in writing could give grounds for adjudication. The 
decisions in cases such as RJT Engineers Ltd v DM Engineering (Northern Ireland) 
Ltd52 and Mast Electrical Services v Kendall Cross Holdings Limited53 had previously 
meant that in the majority of instances when there was no written contract, there 
would be no option to settle disputes by SA.  However, this provision is now removed 
and all oral contracts are now included.  Coulson believes that superficially this 
amendment is a positive since it does away with the complex decisions relating to 
whether a particular contract is in writing or not.  However, he states that this new 
provision will add considerable burden to the work of adjudicators since they may use 
a considerable portion of the 28-day period trying to determine if there is a contract in 
place or not, meaning they may not have enough time left to fairly decide the 
dispute54.   
 
Indeed, it seems likely that allowing SA for oral contracts will mean that a longer 
period (extended beyond the 28 or even 42-day period) is required for the proceedings 
due to more time taken to determine whether there was actually an oral contract or 
not, which will be much harder than determining whether there was a written contract 
in.  In terms of costs incurred by the parties, extended SAs will mean higher 
adjudicator fees, higher legal and expert fees and higher expenses.  Also, management 
time will be tied up with SAs for longer periods, preventing them from concentrating 
on other areas of their business, thus potentially losing money elsewhere.  However, 
in allowing disputes under oral contracts to be referred to SA, more of the original 
companies that the act intended to help who may not have the ability or leverage to 
put in place written contracts, will in theory be given the chance to stand up against 
bigger companies. 
 
In the recent case of Rob Purton t/a Richwood Interiors v Kilker Projects Limited55 
Rob Purton undertook joinery works for Kilker projects at the Dorchester Hotel.  
                                                 
51 The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 s 139(1). 
52 [2002] EWCA Civ 270. 
53 [2007] EWHC 1296 (TCC). 
54 Peter Coulson, ‘Coulson On Construction Adjudication’ (2nd edn, Oxford 2011) 4.08 - 4.09. 
55 [2015] EWHC 2624 (TCC). 
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Purton claimed that he entered into an oral contract with Kilker to undertake works 
for £350,000.  The dispute was referred to SA where the adjudicator awarded a sum of 
147,223 (the requested final account sum) plus the SA costs of £4,184.  Following the 
adjudicator’s decision, Kilker refused to pay on the grounds that the adjudicator had 
no jurisdiction due to there being no contract and the decision was taken to the TCC 
for enforcement.  The court rejected that there was no contract in place, with the judge 
stating56 “[T]o my mind it seems clear beyond argument that there was a contract. 
There was substantial "performance" on both sides, with Mr Purton doing the works 
and Kilker making payments.”57 The court also decided that even in circumstances 
where each term of a contract was not identified with complete accuracy that did not 
prevent the adjudicator having jurisdiction. 
 
Based upon limited case since the amendments, it seems as though in future 
adjudicators will attempt to go to the lengths required to find the existence of an oral 
contract, which will be difficult to prove as by its very nature, even the ‘best’ oral 
contract will often be one party’s word against the others.  
 
 
4.2 Slips 
Section 140 of the LDEDCA adds section 108(3A) to the HGCRA which codifies the 
Adjudicator's power to make corrections to his decisions.58 This amendment 
essentially codifies the decision in Bloor v Kirkland59 which allowed the adjudicator 
to correct his ‘slip’ in his decision.   
 
Section (10)(2) of the Scheme amendments adds section 22A to the Scheme which 
reflects amendments made to the HGCRA allowing an adjudicator to amend his 
decision within five days of delivery to the parties. Whilst this amendment only puts 
into legislation what is already case law, the 5-day limit to change a slip in the 
decision puts a time limit which gives the parties further clarity.  
 
4.3 Apportionment of Costs 
                                                 
56 ibid. 
57 [2015] EWHC 2624 (TCC) at paragraph 18. 
58 The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 s 140. 
59 [2000] EWHC 183 (TCC). 
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Section 141 of the LDEDCA adds a new section 108A to the HGCRA which deals 
with the apportionment of costs between the parties.60 These amendments codify the 
decisions made in recent cases. In Bridgeway Construction Ltd v Tolent Construction 
Ltd61 a clause was written into the contract which meant the party who referred a 
dispute to SA would bear all the costs regardless of whether they won or lost.  This 
contractual provision was upheld as valid in this case.  However, in Yuanda Co Ltd v 
WW Gear Construction Ltd62 a construction contract contained provisions stating the 
referring party will pay the legal fees of both parties and the adjudicator, irrespective 
of whether or not it wins or loses.  It was held that these provisions were not valid and 
replaced by the whole of Part I of the Scheme. 
 
This amendment essentially guarantees that at least in terms of apportionment of 
costs, a paying party cannot be ‘put off’ from referring a dispute to SA for financial 
reasons.  For example, an employer who writes such a term into a contract will know 
that often the contractor who is tendering for the work will adhere to a clause such as 
this, as they could be in no position to turn down the work from a financial standpoint.  
Therefore, they will sign up to the contract regardless.   However, this amendment 
redistributes the power slightly and reinforces the intention of SA, namely any party 
no matter how small in stature, can refer any dispute at any time for quick 
determination.  
 
 
5. Statutory Adjudication in Singapore 
Following the success of the statutory adjudication provisions contained in The 
HGCRA, other commonwealth jurisdictions followed suit and introduced similar 
legislation.  The first to be introduced was the New South Wales Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Act63 (NSW Act) in 199964, with 
amendments made in 200265 to overcome early decision enforcement issues and make 
                                                 
60 The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 s 141. 
61 [2000] CILL 1662. 
62 [2010] EWHC 720 (TCC). 
63 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW). 
64 R. Rana, ‘Is adjudication killing arbitration?’ (2009) 75(2) Arbitration 223. 
65 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Act 2002 No 133 (NSW). 
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the legislation more effective66. Following the NSW Act, Western Australia67, 
Queensland68, Northern Territory69, New Zealand70 and Singapore71 quickly adopted 
similar legislation between 2002 and 2004.  The Australian state of Queensland and 
Singapore chose to base its legislation primarily on the NSW Act rather than the UK 
Construction Act.  Subsequently NSW, Queensland and Singapore are known as “The 
Australian East Coast Model” as opposed to “The UK model” 72.   
 
The Singapore Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 
(SOPA) however, presents interesting challenges for SA in the UK, with regard to the 
development of statutory control of the payment process.73 The SOPA came into force 
on 1 April 2005 and essentially follows the New South Wales Act whilst being clearly 
inspired by the HGCRA. The SOPA Regulations74 are a set of regulations used in 
conjunction with the SOP Act, in a similar way to the Scheme and the HGCRA in the 
UK.  In general, the SOPA and the Regulations are a lot more descriptive than the UK 
legislation, attempting to leave less ambiguity than the HGCRA has.   
 
5.1 Statutory Adjudication under the Singapore Building and Construction 
Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 
Under the SOPA disputes for adjudication must arise under agreements made in 
writing,75 unlike the amendment to include oral contracts in UK SA, introduced under 
the LDEDCA. Sections 4(3)(a) and 4(3)(b) SOPA are essentially the same as the 
HGCRA Sections (107)(2)(a) and (b), whilst 4(3)(c) and 4(3)(d) are more elaborative 
                                                 
66 Peter Sheridan, Dominic Helps, Robert Fenwick Elliot & Jeremy Coggins, ‘Construction Act Review 
(July) 2007’ (2007) 23(5) Construction Law Journal 364. 
67 Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA). 
68 Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (QL). 
69 Construction Contracts (Security of Payment Act) 2004 (NT). 
70 Construction Contracts Act 2002 (NZ). 
71 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 (SG). 
72 Peter Sheridan, Dominic Helps, Robert Fenwick Elliot & Jeremy Coggins, ‘Construction Act Review 
(July) 2007’ (2007) 23(5) Construction Law Journal 364. It appears as though the overarching 
difference between the models centres essentially around the desired scale of what can be decided in an 
adjudication and how quickly it can be referred and concluded.  Indeed, Hudson’s states that in reality, 
the Australian East Coast model deals with the perceived problem of cash flow in relation to 
construction work in a much more direct and prescriptive way than the UK model and that this is much 
more in line with the original intention of the HGCRA. 
73 Chow Kok Fong, ‘Publication Review: Security of Payment and Construction Adjudication’ (2006) 
22(2) Construction Law Journal 145. 
74 The Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Regulations 2006 (SG). 
75 S4(1) SOPA. 
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versions of the Section 107(2)(c) which states that the HGCRA applies if the 
agreement is evidenced in writing.   
 
In the case of QM Pte Ltd v Mr QN76 the contract documents under which the dispute 
was referred to the adjudicator were clearly incomplete, yet the adjudicator found 
there to be a contract in writing due to the existence of a memorandum of agreement 
which recorded in writing the essential terms of the contract between the parties.  In 
JL Pte Ltd v JM Pte Ltd77 the only written evidence of a contract was a quotation 
which the respondent argued did not constitute a written contract.  The adjudicator 
agreed that there was only an oral contract between the parties and that the burden of 
proof must fall on the party relying on the existence of a contract to demonstrate that 
it was made in writing.  Therefore, the dispute could not be referred to SA under the 
SOPA.  Contrastingly, in LH Pte Lt v LI Pte Ltd78 the adjudicator found there to be a 
written contract based upon a quotation with handwritten comments which was 
followed by an oral instruction to commence works. 
 
The above cases demonstrate that the position on written contracts in Singapore is 
essentially the same as it was in the UK before the LDEDCA amendments to allow 
oral contracts.  It is apparent that in most instances the adjudicator will try his utmost 
to find the existence of a written contract, from various documents and 
correspondence between the parties.  Fong states that many domestic Singapore sub-
contracts, especially for the supply of labour, will often be wholly oral and will 
therefore be excluded from the SOPA.79 He notes this is regrettable from a public 
policy standpoint as these are the type of companies that lack the contractual leverage 
and would have relied upon SA. 
 
5.1.1 Timescales under the SOPA 
Section 12 of the SOPA states the very specific circumstances under which a SA can 
be commenced under the SOPA: 
i) When a claimant disputes a payment response (Section 12(2)(a)); 
                                                 
76 AA118 0f 2009 [2009] SCAdjR 654. 
77 AA05 of 2009 [2009] SCAdjR 75. 
78 AA36 of 2009 [2009] SCAdjR 181. 
79 Chow Kok Fong, ‘Security of Payments and Construction Adjudication’, (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2013) 
3.41 
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ii) When a claimant is not provided with a payment response (Section 12(2)(b));  
iii) When a claimant fails to receive payment by the due date (section 12(1)). 
 
These provisions are in contrast to S108 (1) and (2) of the HGRCA where any party 
can refer any dispute to SA at any time. This means that whereas in the UK, anything 
under the contract can be adjudicated upon, in Singapore a dispute will only be 
entertained where it arises over a payment claim.  However, it is clear that the items in 
that payment claim can be far ranging and in opening up the payment claim, the 
adjudicator could be dealing with many commercial aspects of the project. In 
addition, the adjudication process under the SOPA is more timescale driven than that 
under the HGCRA.  Whilst there are deadlines under the HGCRA, they are not as 
stringent as those in the SOPA80.  
 
In the UK, the referral must be served to the adjudicator within 7 days of his 
appointment.  However, under the SOPA once notice is given to the other party, the 
claimant shall make an ‘adjudication application’ (the equivalent of the referral in the 
UK) within 7 days of when he is entitled to do so at specific points in time as dictated 
by section 12 of the SOPA mentioned above.  In the case of JFC Builders Pte Ltd v 
Lion City Construction Co Pte Ltd81it was decided that the earliest date that the 
adjudication notice could be served to the responding party was before the entitlement 
to apply for adjudication crystallises in line with Section 12(2) of the SOPA.  
Conversely, the latest date for serving of the notice of adjudication is earlier in the 
same day that the adjudication application is submitted to the nominating body under 
section 13(2) of the SOPA82.  These cases demonstrate the earliest and latest dates that 
the claiming party can serve its notice on the responding party.  Although there is a 
period in line with the SOPA in which a party is entitled to refer a payment claim 
dispute to SA, they can actually pre-empt this and give notice to the responding party 
earlier than the commencement of this period.  The latest date is the same date that the 
adjudication application is submitted to the nominating body.  Contrastingly, in the 
UK a party can serve notice of intention to refer a dispute to SA at any time.  Despite 
some leeway in terms of earliest and latest dates, there is still a window in which the 
                                                 
80Building & Construction Authority, ‘Security of Payments Act Flowchart’ (BCA, 2006) 
<https://www.bca.gov.sg/SecurityPayment/others/SOP_flowchart.pdf> accessed 3 March 2016. 
81 [2012] SGHC 243. 
82 ibid. 
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notice can be raised in Singapore.  If this is missed, the chance to adjudicate is 
forfeited until the next month’s payment claim is served. 
 
In the UK, there is no specified timescale for the submission of a response to the 
referral.  The adjudicator and the parties will decide upon this once the adjudication 
has commenced.  In Singapore, once the referral is submitted, the responding party 
gets 7 days to submit its response.  The SA does not actually commence until the 
response is submitted. Under Section 16(2)(b) if the responding party does not submit 
its document within the 7-day period, the SA is commenced without it and there is no 
option to submit it in the future.  There is no equivalent provision in the HGCRA.  
Also, the SA does not commence until the adjudicator has been appointed and the 
referring and responding parties have submitted their respective documents83; by 
contrast in the UK the SA commences when the adjudicator has been appointed and 
he is in possession of the referring party’s documents.  
 
Section 17(1)(a) and Section 17(1)(b) state the maximum length of the SA is between 
7 and 14 days depending on the type of dispute.  In comparison to the UK, the 
maximum is 28 days84 with the option to extend to 42 days85.  However, both the 
SOPA and the HGCRA allow the adjudicator and the parties to agree on any further 
time period.  The fact that the default time scales are shorter than those in the HGCRA 
indicates an even greater importance upon speed in resolving the dispute and getting 
cash flowing again. However, it could be argued that a shorter timescale is adequate 
for disputes under the SOPA since they only relate to payment, whereas the greater 
range of disputes and both oral and written contracts which fall under the HGCRA 
mean that the 28-day period is necessary.   
 
Just as under S108 (3) HGRCA, s21 SOPA provides that the SA decision in binding 
until final determination by arbitration or litigation; or if the parties agree to settle. 
Also, S17(6) SOPA directly follows the position in the UK with regard to ‘slips’. 
 
 
                                                 
83 S16 (1) SOPA. 
84 The Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 s 108(2)(c). 
85 ibid s 108(2)(d). 
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5.1.2 Adjudication Review Procedure 
Section 18 of the SOPA contains an ‘Adjudication review procedure’86 which is 
unique to the SOPA and does not appear in the HGCRA, the New Zealand Act or any 
of the Australian Acts87.  The adjudication review procedure allows any injustices 
inflicted upon parties during the cut and thrust of the original SA to be remedied at a 
stage before they are referred to final determination by arbitration or litigation88.  
However, the review procedure allows the substantive merits of the original 
determination to be re-examined, it doesn’t enable the determination to be completely 
overruled, as a court may do89. 
 
Section 18(2) of the SOPA states90: 
 
…where a respondent to whom this section applies is aggrieved by the 
determination of the adjudicator, the respondent may, within 7 days after being 
served the adjudication determination, lodge an application for the review of 
the determination with the authorised nominating body with which the 
application for the adjudication had been lodged under section 13.  
 
The review procedure is only available to the respondent and must be made within 7 
days of the serving of the determination.91 Upon reviewing the determination, the 
review adjudicator or panel will have 14 days92 to provide a new ‘substitute’ 
determination or refuse the review application and uphold the original 
determination.93  In RN & Associates Pte Ltd v TPX Builders Pte Ltd94 it was decided 
that if a respondent is aggrieved with the decision in the SA and that the difference in 
the sum in question is above S$100,000, the proper course of action would be to refer 
the determination to the review procedure so that the substantive findings could be re-
examined and analysed, rather than try to get the determination set aside at court.  
                                                 
86 ibid s 18. 
87 Chow Kok Fong, ‘Security of Payments and Construction Adjudication’, (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2013) 
17.1. 
88 SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2009] SGHC 257 at [24]. 
89 ibid at [38]. 
90 Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 s 18(2) (SG). 
91 S18 (6) SOPA. 
92 Ibid S19(3). 
93 Ibid s19(4). 
94 [2012] SGHC 225. 
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This case considered the scope of adjudication reviews and decided that the 
adjudication review procedure should always be actioned first before attempting to get 
a determination set aside.  This makes sense, since there would be no point in having 
the procedure available if it was not used in the first instance.  This is also a way of 
keeping party’s costs down, since a review procedure will cost less than trying to set 
the determination aside in court.   
 
In MU Pte Ltd v MV Pte Ltd95 it was decided that whilst there might be extenuating 
circumstances meaning that new evidence had come to light between the first SA and 
the review, this new evidence will in most cases not be considered as only the maters 
presented before the adjudicator in the first instance should be considered.  The 
decision in this case means that in all but the rarest circumstances, the review 
adjudication should only consider the evidence presented in front of the first 
adjudicator.  This is sensible, in so much as if too much new evidence is submitted, it 
essentially could be that the review adjudicators will be assessing a completely 
different case to that in the first adjudication.  
 
5.2 Costs  
Section 16(3)(b) is the same as section 12(b) of the Scheme in the UK which provides 
against an adjudicator incurring unnecessary expense. Section 2 defines costs as 
having two components, namely application fees and the fees and expenses of the 
adjudicator. Section 30 (1) of the SOPA specifically provides that “[T]he costs of any 
adjudication shall not exceed such amount as may be prescribed by the Minister.”  
 
The SOPA puts a maximum cap on the costs of an SA which is prescribed by the 
government.  Regulation 12 of the Regulations sets out the maximum fees for 
adjudication applications and for adjudicator’s hourly and daily fees.96 The current 
costs set out in the Regulations are worth citing in detail: 
 
For the purposes of section 30(1) of the Act –  
(a) the fee payable to an authorised nominating body shall not 
exceed — 
                                                 
95 ARA01 of 2009 [2009] SCAdjR 995 at [28]. 
96 The Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Regulations 2006 s 12 (SG). 
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(i) $600 for each adjudication application; and 
(ii) $1,200 for each adjudication review application; 
 
(b) the fee payable to an adjudicator (excluding a review adjudicator or a 
panel of review adjudicators) shall be computed on the basis of a rate not 
exceeding $300 per hour or $2,400 per day, and shall not exceed in the 
aggregate the following maximum amount: 
 
(i) where the claimed amount exceeds $24,000, 10% of the claimed amount; or 
(ii) in any other case, $2,400. 
 
There is no such maximum cap in the UK and fees and expenses incurred by the 
Adjudicator can be passed down to the parties. This maximum cap was put in place in 
Singapore to “safeguard policy objectives and to ensure that the costs of adjudication 
are controlled within certain bounds to maintain the affordability of the recourse 
under the Act”97.  This cap in fees ensures that to some extent SA costs are kept down, 
ensuring that the original intention of SA as an affordable dispute resolution method is 
preserved.  The cap in fees will reduce the risk of putting smaller companies such as 
sub-contractors off referring disputes.  When this is coupled with shorter timescales 
for the process, the costs to the parties may be considerably lower than the UK, where 
there is no cap and the SA process is longer. Section 30(2) is however similar to 
Section 25 of the Scheme in the UK wherein it provides that as in the UK, the 
adjudicator will determine how his costs (fees) are apportioned between the parties. 
Nevertheless the SOPA’s cap on costs ensures that the parties who are in an 
adjudication will have an idea of the maximum fees they will have to pay at the 
outset. 
 
 
5.3 Fees 
Here again, it is beneficial to iterate the detail of Section 31 of the SOPA which deals 
with the adjudicator’s fees: 
                                                 
97 Chow Kok Fong, ‘Security of Payments and Construction Adjudication’, (2nd edn, Lexis Nexis 2013) 
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(1) Subject to this section, an adjudicator is entitled to be paid, in relation to an 
adjudication application —  
 
(a) such fees as may be specified by the authorised nominating body which 
appointed the adjudicator; and  
 
(b) such amount, by way of expenses, as may be agreed between the 
adjudicator and the parties to the adjudication or, if no such amount is agreed, 
then as the authorised nominating body considers to be reasonable having 
regard to the work done and expenses incurred by the adjudicator. 
 
This section is different to the HGCRA.  In the UK, section 25 of the Scheme states 
that the adjudicator is entitled to payment of such amounts in relation to fees and 
expenses.  However, section 31 of the SOPA clearly states that he is entitled to fees as 
agreed with the nominating body at the commencement of the proceedings, as well as 
expenses.  Here the SOPA is clearly more specific than the HGCRA - if the parties do 
not agree to the adjudicator’s expenses, the nominating body will determine what is 
reasonable.     
 
6. Conclusion 
The HGCRA and Scheme contain several provisions for SA, some of which by their 
nature have a direct or indirect impact on the costs of SA to the parties. The 
comparisons between the HGCRA and the SOPA reveal that while there are 
similarities, there are also contrasts primarily with regards to costs, which our 
examination of the SA process in Singapore demonstrate, may be of use in a future 
review of the HGCRA.   
 
Such a future review could consider for the reasons already examined in the foregoing 
discussions: (i) a maximum cap on adjudicator’s fees, and (ii) provisions for 
Adjudication review procedures.  
